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Abstract
Machine learning promises methods that gener-
alize well from finite labeled data. However, the
brittleness of existing neural net approaches is
revealed by notable failures, such as the existence
of adversarial examples that are misclassified de-
spite being nearly identical to a training example,
or the inability of recurrent sequence-processing
nets to stay on track without teacher forcing. We
introduce a method, which we refer to as state
reification, that involves modeling the distribution
of hidden states over the training data and then
projecting hidden states observed during testing
toward this distribution. Our intuition is that if
the network can remain in a familiar manifold of
hidden space, subsequent layers of the net should
be well trained to respond appropriately. We show
that this state-reification method helps neural nets
to generalize better, especially when labeled data
are sparse, and also helps overcome the challenge
of achieving robust generalization with adversar-
ial training.
1. Introduction
The fundamental objective of machine learning is to build
models of complex data. By abstracting from the data,
models are typically more useful for domain understanding
and prediction than are the raw data. This substitution of a
model in place of the data is a form of reification. In this
article, we argue that reification of data has similar value
even when the data originate from within the model, i.e., its
latent states. We propose a recursive model-within-a-model
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Figure 1. (a) A distribution of hidden states, with class label in-
dicated by color. (b) State reification dynamics to map hidden
states toward regions of higher density. (c) A distribution of input
states, showing poorly separated classes, making it not suitable for
reification.
that reifies internal states in a neural network, leading to
robustness and improved generalization.
Our proposed method, which we call state reification, is
based on the idea that it is possible to model the distribution
of the hidden states over the training data, and then map
less likely states toward more likely states. Because the
network has experienced these latter states frequently during
training, we would expect to obtain better generalization
from them. To offer an intuition, consider a simple task:
training a recurrent net to output the parity of a stream
of binary digits. The ideal internal state for solving this
task is discrete, yet deep neural networks have continuous
activations. Consequently, when evaluated on long test
sequences, the continuous dynamics may cause the net to
wander from the ideal states. State reification will map these
rogue states back to the values observed during training,
leading to dramatically better generalization.
Our approach stems from the observation that latent states,
such as hidden representations, tend to lie on one or more
manifolds. Figure 1a depicts a hidden representation of a
training set in a classification task, with class label indicated
by color. States within the manifold are ‘familiar’ in the
sense that subsequent layers of the net have been tuned to
process them. However, states lying outside the manifold
are potentially problematic; they are not reached given the
distribution of training inputs, and therefore the model’s
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extrapolatory response may be unreliable.
In this work, we explore an approach in which we construct
a model-within-a-model that implicitly encodes the distri-
bution of states in the latent space and then projects states
from off-manifold regions back to the manifold, where the
network is likely to perform robustly (Figure 1b). We argue
that this projection operation serves as a useful inductive
bias during training that restricts the state space and induces
a clustering of states. Not only does it boost generalization
performance, but it also makes networks less sensitive to
adversarial input perturbations, which tend to throw the state
off the training manifold. Explicit detection of off-manifold
states has proven useful for adversarial robustness and de-
tecting out-of-distribution samples (Carrara et al., 2018; Lee
et al., 2017; 2018), as has incorporating losses to shape the
manifolds (Pang et al., 2018). Without explicitly addressing
manifolds, Liao et al. (2016) proposed a clustering-based
regularization objective to encourage parsimonious repre-
sentations. We present a general method that goes beyond
clustering states and identifying off-manifold states by pro-
jecting states back to the manifold. Like Liao et al. (2016),
our method can be applied to any architecture or any layer
of a network.
One could in-principle reify off-manifold inputs rather than
off-manifold hidden states. A large body of literature exists
on this topic, from early work achieving noise robustness
via preprocessing stages that estimate and filter noise from
an input signal (Boll, 1979) to more recent work in ma-
chine learning involving loss functions to achieve invariance
to task-irrelevant perturbations in the input (Simard et al.,
1992; Zheng et al., 2016). However, there are two reasons
to prefer reification of hidden states. First, distinct semantic
classes are typically more intertwined in the input space
than in the hidden space (Figure 1c), and the manifolds are
therefore simpler and smoother in an abstract space with
simpler statistical structure. Second, state reification should
have particular value in recurrent nets in which steps off
manifold may compound as the hidden state evolves over a
sequence.
We also briefly note that State Reification closely builds on
the ideas presented in State-Denoising RNNs (Mozer et al.,
2018) and Fortified Networks (Lamb et al., 2018).
2. State Reification
To show the robustness of our underlying insight, we de-
scribe two distinct but related mechanisms for state reifica-
tion: denoising autoencoders and attractor networks.
2.1. Denoising Autoencoders
Denoising autoencoders (DAEs) are neural networks that
map a noise-corrupted version of vector x to a clean version
of x. This approach has been widely used for feature learn-
ing and generative modeling in deep learning (Bengio et al.,
2013). More formally, denoising autoencoders are trained to
minimize a reconstruction error or negative log-likelihood
of generating the clean x. For example, with Gaussian log-
likelihood of the clean vector given the corrupted vector, the
reconstruction loss for data set x = {x(1), . . . , x(N)} is
Lrec(x) = 1
N
N∑
n=1
(∥∥∥rθ (x(n) + a(n))− x(n)∥∥∥2
2
)
, (1)
where rθ is the learned denoising function and
a(n) ∼ N(0, σ2I) is a Gaussian noise vector.
Given loss Lrec and Gaussian corruption, a well-trained de-
noising autoencoder’s reconstruction vector is proportional
to the gradient of the log-density (Alain et al., 2012):
rσ(x)− x
σ2
→ ∂ log p(x)
∂x
as σ → 0. (2)
The theory of Alain et al. (2012) establishes that the recon-
struction vectors from a well-trained denoising autoencoder
form a vector field which points in the direction of the data
manifold. However, this result is not guaranteed for points
distant from the manifold, as these points are rarely sam-
pled during training. In practice, denoising autoencoders
are trained with not just tiny noise levels but also with large
noise levels, which blurs the data distribution as seen by the
learner but makes the network learn a useful vector field
even far from the data.
2.2. Attractor Networks
DAEs can be applied iteratively by cycling the output back
to the input. A related but more principled approach is an
attractor network (AN), which is essentially a DAE with
recurrent connections within the hidden layer that results in
a discrete-time nonlinear dynamical system with attractor
manifolds, achieving trajectories like those shown in Fig-
ure 1b. Attractor nets have a long history starting with the
seminal work of (Hopfield, 1982) that was partly responsi-
ble for the 1980s wave of excitement in neural networks. We
adopt Koiran’s (1994) framework, which dovetails with the
standard deep learning assumption of synchronous updates
on continuous-valued neurons. Koiran shows that a hidden
layer with symmetric weights, nonnegative self-connections,
and a bounded nonlinearity that is continuous and strictly
increasing except at the extrema (e.g., tanh), the network
asymptotically converges over iterations to a fixed point or
limit cycle of length 2. Although the AN is recurrent, its
training barely suffers from vanishing gradients (Bengio
et al., 1994; Hochreiter, 1998) because the input projects to
the hidden layer at each iteration, acting as a type of skip
connection. Technical details are presented in the supple-
mentary materials.
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Figure 2. (a) A network that performs some input-output mapping
task with one intervening hidden layer. (b) A DAE that produces a
reified output. (c) Integrating the two architectures to perform state
reification on the hidden state. (d) A recurrent sequence processing
architecture, unrolled in time horizontally, with an attractor net—
unrolled vertically—reifying the hidden state.
2.3. Incorporating State Reification Into a Model
We incorporate state reification within a neural net’s internal
layers to transform the representation toward the training-
data manifold. For example, Figure 2a shows a feedforward
net that maps inputs to outputs through a hidden layer. Fig-
ure 2b shows a DAE with one internal layer, producing
a reified output. Figure 2c integrates the feedforward net
and DAE to reify the hidden state of the feedforward net.
Figure 2d shows a more elaborate architecture, with a re-
current sequence-processing net integrated with an attractor
net. Each column denotes a single time step with a corre-
sponding input and output. The hidden state is denoised
by an attractor net, unrolled vertically, yielding a reified
state which is combined with the next input to determine the
next hidden state. Intuitively, the method aims to regularize
the hidden representations by projecting activations to the
training-data manifold through the application of a DAE or
attractor net.
To train the simple integrated model (Figure 2c), training
data are processed in mini-batches, and the loss per (x, y)
example is:
L = Ltask(x, y) + λrec Lrec(h) (3)
is minimized, where Lrec (Equation 1) is applied to the hid-
den state, h, Ltask is a primary-task loss, and the coefficient
λrec > 0 controls the contribution of reification. This ap-
proach allows us in principle to reify multiple hidden layers
at once, each with its own Lrec loss. In the next sections, we
present results for two related applications: obtaining robust
generalization to out-of-sample cases in sequential tasks,
and obtaining robustness to standard adversarial attacks in
feedforward nets. We use slightly different training proce-
dures for each application, due to the different goals. For
improving test-set generalization, we train only the reifier
(DAE or AN) weights on Lrec, all weights on Ltask, and
we set the noise level, σ2 = 0, for evaluation. For adver-
sarial robustness, we train all weights on the joint loss, and
perform simulations with and without the noise during eval-
uation; we also incorporate additional adversarial loss terms
that are duals to Lrec and Ltask, to be described shortly.
3. Experiments
We demonstrate the effectiveness of state reification on
three classes of problems: sequence classification in a data-
limited training environment, generation of long sequences,
and adversarial perturbations in image processing.
3.1. Recurrent Networks for Sequence Classification
Our first experiments involve symbolic sequence-
classification tasks using recurrent networks like that in
Figure 2d, where state reification is performed with attractor
dynamics. We chose symbolic tasks—tasks with discrete
inputs, and input-output mappings that can be characterized
in terms of rules—because symbolic tasks have always
been a challenge for continuous neural networks (Craven
and Shavlik, 1993).
3.1.1. PARITY
We studied a streamed parity task in which 10 binary inputs
are presented in sequence and the target output following the
last sequence element is 1 if an odd number of 1s is present
in the input or 0 otherwise. The architecture has 10 hid-
den units, 20 attractor units, and a single input and a single
output. We experimented with both tanh and GRU hidden
units. We trained the attractor net with σ = .5 and ran it
for exactly 15 iterations (more than sufficient to converge).
Models were trained on 256 randomly selected binary se-
quences. Two distinct test sets were used to evaluate models:
one consisted of the held-out 768 binary sequences, and a
second test set consisted of three copies of each of the 256
training sequences with additive uniform [−0.1,+0.1] input
noise. We performed one hundred replications of a base-
line architecture (RNN), an architecture with the additional
layers to implement attractor dynamics but trained solely
on Ltask (RNN+, the ’+’ indicating the additional hardware),
and an architecture with state reification (RNN+SR). Other
details of this and subsequent simulations are presented in
the Supplementary Materials.
Figure 3a shows relative performance on the held-out se-
State Reification
(a)
RNN RNN+ RNN+SR
Architecture (tanh)
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1.0
Ne
w 
Se
qu
en
ce
s
Pr
op
or
tio
n 
Co
rre
ct (c)
RNN RNN+ RNN+SR
Architecture (GRU)
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1.0
.125 .250 .375 .500 .625 .750
Noise Standard Deviation
0.70
0.75
0.80
0.85 (e)
0 2-4 2-3 2-2 2-1 20 21
Weight Decay
0.70
0.75
0.80
0.85 (g)
(b)
RNN RNN+ RNN+SR
Architecture (tanh)
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1.0
Ad
dit
ive
 N
ois
e
Pr
op
or
tio
n 
Co
rre
ct (d)
RNN RNN+ RNN+SR
Architecture (GRU)
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1.0
.125 .250 .375 .500 .625 .750
Noise Standard Deviation
0.80
0.85
0.90
0.95 (f)
0 2-4 2-3 2-2 2-1 20 21
Weight Decay
0.80
0.85
0.90
0.95 (h)
Figure 3. Parity simulations. Top row shows generalization perfor-
mance on novel binary sequences; bottom row shows performance
on trained sequences with additive noise. Unless otherwise noted,
the simulations of with state reification use σ = 0.5, 15 attractor
iterations, and L2 regularization (a.k.a. weight decay) 0.0. Er-
ror bars indicate ±1 SEM, based on a correction for confidence
intervals with matched comparisons (Masson and Loftus, 2003).
quences by the RNN, RNN+, and RNN+SR with a tanh hidden
layer. Figure 3b shows the same pattern of results for the
noisy test sequences. RNN+SR significantly outperforms
both the RNN and the RNN+: it generalizes better to novel
sequences and is better at ignoring additive noise in test
cases, although such noise was absent from training. Fig-
ures 3c,d show similar results for models with a GRU hidden
layer. Absolute performance improves for all three recur-
rent net variants with GRUs versus tanh hidden units, but
the relative pattern of performance is unchanged. Note that
the improvement due to denoising the hidden state (i.e.,
RNN+SR versus RNN for both tanh and GRU architectures)
is much larger than the improvement due to switching hid-
den unit type (i.e., RNN with GRU vs. tanh hidden), and that
the use of GRUs—and the equivalent LSTM—is viewed as
a critical innovation in deep learning.
In principle, parity should be performed more robustly if a
system has a highly restricted state space. Ideally, the state
space would itself be binary, indicating whether the number
of inputs thus far is even or odd. Such a restricted represen-
tation should force better generalization. Indeed, quantizing
the hidden activation space for all sequence steps of the test
set, we obtain a lower entropy for the tanh RNN+SR (3.70,
standard error .06) than for the tanh RNN (4.03, standard
error .05). However, what is surprising about this simula-
tion is that gradient-based procedures could learn such a
restricted representation, especially when two orthogonal
losses compete with each other during training. The com-
peting goals are clearly beneficial, as RNN+ and RNN+SR
share the same architecture and differ only in the addition
of the denoising loss.
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Figure 4. Simulation results on majority task with (a) novel and
(b) noisy sequences. (c) Reber grammar. (d) Simulation results on
Reber grammar. Error bars indicate±1 SEM, based on a correction
for confidence intervals with matched comparisons (Masson and
Loftus, 2003).
The noise being suppressed during training is neither input
noise nor label noise; it is noise in the internal state due to
weights that have not yet been adapted to the task. Nonethe-
less, denoising internal state during training appears to help
the model overcome input noise and generalize better.
3.1.2. MAJORITY TASK
We next studied a majority task in which the input is a
binary sequence and the target output is 1 if a majority of
inputs are 1, or 0 otherwise. We trained networks on 100
distinct randomly drawn fixed-length sequences, for length
l ∈ {11, 17, 23, 29, 35}. We performed 100 replications for
each l and each model. We ensured that runs of the various
models were matched using the same weight initialization
and the same training and test sets. All models had 10 tanh
hidden units, 20 attractor units, σ = .25.
We chose the majority task because, in contrast to the parity
task, we were uncertain if a restricted state representation
would facilitate task performance. For the majority task of
a given length l, the network needs to distinguish roughly
2l states. Collapsing them together is potentially dangerous:
if the net does not keep exact count of the input sequence
imbalance between 0’s and 1’s, it may fail.
As in the parity task, we tested both on novel binary se-
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quences and training sequences with additive uniform noise.
Figures 4a,b show that neither the RNN nor RNN+ beats
RNN+SR for any sequence length on either test set. RNN+SR
seems superior to the baseline RNN for short novel se-
quences and long noisy sequences. For short noisy se-
quences, both architectures reach a ceiling. The only disap-
pointment in this simulation is the lack of a difference for
novel long sequences.
3.1.3. REBER GRAMMAR
The Reber grammar (Reber, 1967), shown in Figure 4c, has
long been a test case for artificial grammar learning (e.g.,
Hochreiter and Schmidhuber, 1997). The task involves
discriminating between strings that can and cannot be gen-
erated by the finite-state grammar. We generated positive
strings by sampling from the grammar with uniform tran-
sition probabilities. Negative strings were generated from
positive strings by substituting a single symbol for another
symbol such that the resulting string is out-of-grammar. Ex-
amples of positive and negative strings are BTSSXXTTVPSE
and BPTVPXTSPSE, respectively. Our networks used a one-
hot encoding of the seven input symbols, m = 20 tanh
hidden units, n = 40 attractor units, and σ = 0.25. The
number of training examples was varied from 50 to 800,
always with 2000 test examples. Both the training and test
sets were balanced to have an equal number of positive to
negative strings. One hundred replications of each simula-
tion was run.
Figure 4d presents mean test set accuracy on the Reber
grammar as a function of the number of examples used for
training. As with previous data sets, RNN+SR outperforms
the baseline RNN, which in turn outperforms RNN+.
3.1.4. SYMMETRY TASK
The symmetry task involves detecting symmetry in fixed-
length symbol strings such as ACAFBBFACA. This task is
effectively a memory task for an RNN because the first half
of the sequence must be retained to compare against the
second half. We generated strings of length 2s+ f , where
s is the number of symbols in the left and right sides and
f is the number of intermediate fillers. For i ∈ {1, ..., s},
we generated symbols Si ∈ {A, B, ..., H}. We then formed
a string X whose elements are determined by S: Xi = Si
for i ∈ {1, ..., s}, Xi = ∅ for i ∈ {s + 1, ..., s + f}, and
Xi = S2s+f+1−i for i ∈ {s + f + 1, ..., 2s + f}. The
filler ∅ was simply a unique symbol. Negative cases were
generated from a randomly drawn positive case by either
exchanging two adjacent distinct non-null symbols, e.g.,
ACAFBBAFCA, or substituting a single symbol with another,
e.g., AHAFBBFACA. Our training and test sets had an equal
number of positive and negative examples, and the negative
examples were divided equally between the sequences with
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Figure 5. (a) Symmetry task with f = 1 filler; (b) Symmetry task
with f = 10 filler. Error bars indicate ±1 SEM.
exchanges and substitutions.
We trained on 5000 examples and tested on an additional
2000, with the half sequence having length s = 5 and with
an f = 1 or f = 10 slot filler. The longer filler makes
temporal credit assignment more challenging. As shown in
Figures 5, RNN+SR obtains as much as a 70% reduction in
test error over either RNN or RNN+.
3.2. Language Modeling
Turning to a second use of state reification, we explored
whether the technique could be used to detect when the
hidden state has wandered from the training manifold. Our
experiment was performed with an RNN language model
that generates word predictions as output. The model can
be run in generative mode by sampling from the output dis-
tribution and feeding it back to the input. This free-running
mode often produces wide divergences from training (Ben-
gio et al., 2015), because during training, teacher forcing
ensures that the model’s input sequence is a valid (observed)
word sequence. The divergence increases as the sequence
progresses.
Our experiment studies if state reification can detect when it
has been given outputs from its own model (sampling mode)
when trained using ground truth input sequences. We trained
a language model on the standard Text8 dataset, which
is derived from Wikipedia articles. We trained a single-
layer LSTM with 1000 units at the character-level, and
included DAE state-reification between the hidden states
and the output on each time step. In a given sequence,
following 50 sampling steps, the state reification layers had a
reconstruction error on average 103% of the teacher forcing
reconstruction error. Following 180 sampling steps, this
value increased to 112%. Following 300 sampling steps this
value increased even further to 134%. These results provide
clear evidence that the outputs move off of the manifold with
more sampling steps, and that this is effectively measured
by state reification.
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3.3. Adversarial Training
In this section, we turn to a third application of state reifica-
tion: obtaining networks robust to adversarial attacks, which
consist of making small changes to input patterns that alter
the predicted class. For image processing, the modulations
of the input images can be small enough that they are unno-
ticeable to the human eye; the modulations can be so robust
that even when captured through a camera, they change the
predicted class with high probability (Brown et al., 2017).
Such adversarial examples (Goodfellow et al., 2014) can
be found via gradient-based methods (Szegedy et al., 2013;
Goodfellow et al., 2014).
Defenses proposed against adversarial examples include
feature squeezing (Xu et al., 2017), adapted encoding of the
input (Jacob Buckman, 2018), and distillation-related ap-
proaches (Papernot et al., 2015). Many have been shown to
be providing the illusion of defense by lowering the quality
of the gradient signal, without actually providing improved
robustness (Athalye et al., 2018). One defense that is re-
silient to this obfuscated-gradient problem is adversarial
training (Madry et al., 2017). Adversarial training consists
of augmenting the dataset with adversarial examples and
training the model’s predictions to be unchanged by the
adversarial noise.
However, a major challenge of incorporating adversarial
training is that adversarial robustness is often dramatically
worse on test data as compared to train data, suggesting
difficulty in generalization (Schmidt et al., 2018). For this
reason we explored the possibility of improving the perfor-
mance of adversarial training by using state reification.
Adversarial training is a flexible procedure and can be used
with any adversarial attack. For our investigation, we looked
at the multi-step projected gradient descent (PGD) attack
(Madry et al., 2017). We used an l∞ attack with ε ranging
from 0.03 to 0.3 and number of iterations ranging from 7
to 200. The PGD attack (Madry et al., 2017), also referred
to as FGSMk, is a multi-step extension of the Fast Gradient
Sign Method (FGSM) (Goodfellow et al., 2014) attack. The
PGD attack is characterized as follows:
xt+1 = Πx+S
(
xt + α sgn(∇xLtask(x, y))
)
(4)
initialized with x0 as the clean input x and with the cor-
rupted input x˜ as the last step in the sequence. Π refers to
the projection operator, which in this context means pro-
jecting the adversarial example back onto the region within
an ε radius of the original data point after each step in the
adversarial attack.
To apply state reification to adversarial training, we modi-
fied our original state-reification training loss (Equation 3)
with the standard adversarial training loss to encourage the
network to not misclassify the adversarial example, yield-
ing a combined loss for a given example (x, y) with an
adversarial counterpart x˜:
L = Ltask(x, y) + Ltask(x˜, y) + λrec
∑
i∈S
Lirec(hi)
where S is the set of one or more hidden layers to which
reification is applied, and the coefficient λrec ≥ 0 can be
tuned to control the degree of reification. Because we poten-
tially apply reification to multiple layers, we replaced the
AN of our earlier simulations with the simpler DAE.
We have discussed advantages to performing reification in
the hidden space instead of the input space, but the ques-
tion of where exactly reification should be performed in a
deep net remains unanswered: just the final hidden layer?
Every hidden layer? We outline two important consider-
ations regarding this issue. On the one hand, identifying
states that are off-manifold or close to the margin is easier
in the deeper hidden layers (see Figure 6, which we explain
shortly). On the other hand, the states in the deeper hidden
layers may already look non-adversarial due to the effect of
the adversarial perturbations in the shallower layers. While
we are not aware of any formal study of this phenomenon,
it is clearly possible. (Imagine, for example, state reifica-
tion performed on the output from the classifier softmax,
which could only identify unnatural combinations of class
probabilities.) Given these opposing concerns, we argue for
the inclusion of reification at multiple stages of the network,
very much analogous to the inclusion of reification at each
time step of the recurrent net in our previous simulations.
We collected experimental evidence that more directly sup-
ports our decision to perform state reification at many levels
of representation. We constructed FGSM adversarial exam-
ples (ε = 0.3) on small MNIST fully-connected networks
trained normally. As Figure 6 shows, we found that detect-
ing adversarial examples by reconstruction error is possible
both in input and hidden layers, but could be performed by
much smaller autoencoders via the hidden layers.
Tables 1 and 2 present results applying state reification on
CIFAR10 using non-ResNet and ResNet convolutional nets
(CNNs), respectively. Substantially better test-set adversar-
ial robustness is attained via adversarial training when done
in conjunction with state reification, evaluated on a wide
range of ε values (0.03 to 0.3) and number of attack steps
(7 to 200).
Athalye et al. (2018) suggest that models which introduce
components with noisy or unreliable gradients can reduce
the quality of gradient-based attacks. To test this hypothesis,
they introduced backward-pass differentiable approxima-
tion, where the attack treats the “reconstructor” (in our case,
the DAE) as the identity function when computing gradients
for the attack. Our results showed that bypassing the DAE
substantially reduced the strength of the attack, resulting in
State Reification
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Figure 6. Direct experimental evidence that reification is easier in
hidden layers than the input: we added denoising autoencoders
with different capacities to MLPs trained on MNIST, and display
the value of the total reconstruction errors for adversarial examples
divided by the total reconstruction errors for clean examples. A
high value indicates success at detecting adversarial examples. Our
results support the central motivation for state reification: that off-
manifold points can much more easily be detected in the hidden
space (as seen by the relatively constant ratio for the autoencoder
in hidden space) and are much harder to detect in the input space
(as seen by this ratio rapidly falling to zero as the input-space
autoencoder’s capacity is reduced
an increase in PGD accuracy to 67.1% from 40.1% (higher
accuracy implies a weaker attack). Additionally, we ran a
noiseless attack in which the forward and backward passes
were performed without noise. This change strengthened
the attack: PGD accuracy rises to 40.1% from 38.2% (lower
accuracy implies a stronger attack), but we note that this is
much less than the overall gap between state reification and
the same-capacity baseline, suggesting that adding noise did
partially obfuscate gradients, but not to such a degree as to
nullify the improvements from state reification.
4. Related Work
State reification seems related to several recent papers with
a cognitive science focus. Andreas et al. (2017) proposed
a model that efficiently learns new concepts and control
policies by operating in a linguistically constrained repre-
sentational space. The space is obtained by pretraining on
a language task, and this pretraining imposes structure on
subsequent learning. One can view reification as imposing
similar structure, although the bias comes not from a sepa-
rate task or data set, but from representations already learned
for the primary task. Related to language, the conscious-
ness prior of Bengio (2017) suggests a potential role of
operating in a reduced or simplified representational space.
Bengio conjectures that the high dimensional state space of
the brain is unwieldy, and a restricted representation that
selects some information at the expense of other may facili-
Table 1. CIFAR-10 PGD Results with (non-ResNet) CNNs. In
these experiment we apply state reification (with single hidden
layer convolutional autoencoders) following each convolutional
layer. Both experiments were run for 200 epochs and with all
hyperparameters and architecture kept the same with the exception
of state reification being added. We considered different types of
baselines: CNN means we simply remove state reification. CNN+
means that we added extra layers with the same number of units
to match the capacity added by state reification. The three blocks
of results use slightly different architectures for the CNNs and are
thus not directly comparable. All models reported were trained
with adversarial training with a PGD attack. Note that higher PGD
accuracy indicates a stronger defense.
Attack PGD Attack PGD Accuracy
Type Steps Epsilon CNN CNN+ CNN+SR
Normal 7 0.03 33.0 34.2 45.0
Normal 50 0.03 31.6 32.5 42.1
Normal 200 0.03 31.4 32.2 41.5
Normal 100 0.03 35.3 39.2
Normal 100 0.04 24.8 28.0
Normal 100 0.06 14.3 15.6
Normal 100 0.08 12.0 13.0
Normal 100 0.10 11.7 12.9
Normal 100 0.20 10.2 11.3
Normal 100 0.30 8.4 9.6
Normal 100 0.03 33.4 40.1
Noiseless
Attack 100 0.03 38.2
BPDA,
Skip-DAE 100 0.03 67.1
tate rapid learning and efficient inference. For related ideas,
also see Hinton (1990).
On the subject of our experimental results on adversarial
robustness, the observation that adversarial examples often
consist of points off the data manifold and that deep net-
works may not generalize well to these points motivated
several authors to consider the use of the generative models
as a defense against adversarial attacks (Gu and Rigazio,
2014; Ilyas et al., 2017; Samangouei et al., 2018; Liao et al.,
2017). Ilyas et al. (2017); Gilmer et al. (2018) also showed
the existence of adversarial examples which lie on the data
manifold, and Ilyas et al. (2017) showed that training against
adversarial examples forced to lie on the manifold is an
effective defense. Our method shares a closely related mo-
tivation to these prior works, with a key difference being
that we propose to consider the manifold in the space of
learned representations, not the manifold directly in the
visible space. One motivation for this is that the learned
representations have a simpler statistical structure (Bengio
et al., 2012), which makes the task of modeling this mani-
fold and detecting unnatural points much simpler. Learning
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Table 2. CIFAR-10 PGD Results with two powerful ResNet archi-
tectures: PreActResNet18 (He et al., 2016) and WideResNet28-10
(Zagoruyko and Komodakis, 2016). In this experiment we
used a single state reification layer following the 2nd resblock
(ResNet-SR); the baseline consists of the same network with the
state reification removed (ResNet). Both experiments were run for
200 epochs and with all hyperparameters and architecture kept the
same. Note that higher PGD accuracy indicates a stronger defense.
PGD Accuracy (20 steps)
Model baseline SR
PreActResNet18 37.87 39.20
WideResNet28-10 43.28 44.06
the distribution directly in the visible space is still very dif-
ficult (even state of the art models fall short of real data
on metrics like Inception Score) and requires a high capac-
ity model. Additionally, working in the space of learned
representations allows for the use of a relatively simple gen-
erative model, in our case a small denoising autoencoder.
Finally, another important difference is that we always use
state reification together with adversarial training.
Denoising Feature Matching (Warde-Farley and Bengio,
2017) proposed to train a denoising autoencoder in the hid-
den states of the discriminator in a generative adversarial
network. The generator’s parameters are then trained to
make the reconstruction error of this autoencoder small.
This has the effect of encouraging the generator to produce
points which are easy for the model to reconstruct, which
will include true data points. Both this and state reification
use a learned denoising autoencoder in the hidden states of
a network. A major difference is that the denoising feature
matching work focused on generative adversarial networks
and tried to minimize reconstruction error through a learned
generator network, whereas our approach targets the ad-
versarial examples problem. Additionally, our objective
encourages the output of the DAE to denoise adversarial
examples so as to point back to the hidden state of the orig-
inal example, which is different from the objective in the
denoising feature matching work, which encouraged recon-
struction error to be low on states from samples from the
generator network.
MagNet (Meng and Chen, 2017) also proposed a method
using autoencoders in the input space of a deep network to
detect adversarial examples and “reform” them back to the
input space. Their work differs from our approach in two
critical ways. First, our method uses denoising autoencoders
at several levels of representation, whereas MagNet (Meng
and Chen, 2017) only operated in the input space. Second,
our method is used together with adversarial training and
is motivated primarily from the perspective of improving
generalization in adversarial training. Many methods that
have used autoencoders by themselves as a defense against
adversarial examples are successful only when the autoen-
coder is ignored during the attack (Athalye et al., 2018);
however, with state reification, we are able to improve ro-
bustness even when the autoencoder is used for the attack.
In Table 1, we also present various alternative attacks that
skip the autoencoder or don’t inject noise, and found that
robustness was preserved in all cases.
Gilmer et al. (2018) studied the existence of adversarial
examples in the task of classifying between two hollow
concentric shells. Intriguingly, they prove and construct ad-
versarial examples which lie on the data manifold (although
Ilyas et al., 2017, also looked for such examples experi-
mentally using GANs). The existence of such on-manifold
adversarial examples demonstrates that a simplified version
of our model trained with only Lrec and not adversarial
training could not protect against all adversarial examples.
However, combined with adversarial training, state reifica-
tion may still help with on-manifold adversarial examples
as well by mapping the hidden state back to regions where
the model performs well.
5. Discussion
Noise robustness is a highly desirable property in neural
networks. When a neural net performs well, it naturally
exhibits a sort of noise suppression: activation in a layer is
relatively invariant to noise injected at lower layers (Arora
et al., 2018). We described a method, state reification, which
has the explicit objective of attaining robustness to unfamil-
iar variation, and we demonstrated that state reification helps
neural nets to generalize better, especially when labeled data
are sparse, and also helps overcome the challenge of achiev-
ing robust generalization with adversarial training. We also
described two different implementation substrates for state
reification, one using attractor nets and the other denoising
autoencoders. We suspect that other kinds of unsupervised
learning mechanisms that perform representation compres-
sion and density estimation will work as well if not better,
especially those with explicit probabilistic underpinnings.
Our aim has been to show that state reification is an idea
with breadth—over the quite disparate domains of symbolic
sequence recognition and generation tasks and adversarial
robustness. Although state reification appears to have some
practical uses, more basic research is needed to understand
how neural nets perform in regions of hidden state space
outside the training manifold. More broadly, state reification
addresses an issue that is often neglected in deep learning:
how to build robust models given that internal state spaces
are continuous, high dimensional, and often unbounded.
The human brain has solved this problem, and artificial
intelligence needs to do so as well.
State Reification
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